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 1 
STATEMENT OF IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 
 
The Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) respectfully submits this 
brief as amicus curiae in support of Plaintiffs-Appellees. CDT is a non-profit 
public interest organization. For more than twenty-five years, CDT has represented 
the public’s interest in an open, decentralized internet and worked to ensure that 
the constitutional and democratic values of free expression and privacy are 
protected in the digital age. CDT regularly advocates in support of the First 
Amendment and protections for online speech before legislatures, regulatory 
agencies, and courts. 
As an organization that supports internet users’ free expression and other 
human rights, CDT has a strong interest in ensuring that online hosts of user-
generated content can exercise their First Amendment right to moderate content in 
ways that protect and promote the interests of their users. Social media platforms 
commonly establish content policies that specify what speech users can and cannot 
post and enforce those policies to shape their users’ online environment and 
experience or express a platform’s own values. S.B. 7072 unconstitutionally 
restricts covered social media platforms’ ability to create and enforce their content 
policies. While mistakes are inevitable when moderating large amounts of content, 
and social media platforms may at times develop and enforce content policies in a 
manner that subjects them to public criticism for lack of consistency, the First 
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Amendment does not permit the government to substitute its judgment for that of 
private speakers about what speech the speakers will or will not host. CDT writes 
to explain that S.B. 7072 violates the First Amendment because content 
moderation decisions are a quintessential exercise of editorial judgment, and that 
the law harms internet users and the public.  
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 3 
SOURCE OF AUTHORITY TO FILE 
 
 Counsel for Appellants and Appellees have consented to the filing of this 
brief. See Fed. R. App. P. 29(a)(2). 
RULE 29(a)(4)(E) STATEMENT  
 
Amicus declares that: (i) no party’s counsel authored the brief in whole or in 
part; (ii) no party or party’s counsel contributed money intended to fund preparing 
or submitting the brief; and (iii) no person, other than amicus, their members and 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ADDRESSED BY AMICUS 
1. Whether the district court properly held that Plaintiffs-Appellees 
established a likelihood of success on the merits of their claim that S.B. 7072 
violates the First Amendment and that the public interest weighed in favor of a 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 
Online hosts of user-generated content make decisions about what content to 
allow or forbid, highlight or deprioritize, label, or otherwise act upon. These 
editorial judgments, which are known as “content moderation,” shape the values 
and messages a host wishes to convey, the types of speech in which users can 
engage, and the information users receive when using these services.  
The First Amendment prohibits the government from interfering with those 
judgments, even—or especially—when they are controversial and government 
officials disagree with them. See Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 
241, 258 (1974). The First Amendment’s protection for editorial control over 
speech is not limited to the traditional press, but extends to other private speakers’ 
decisions about what speech to include or exclude and how to arrange or distribute 
that speech. S.B. 7072 violates the First Amendment by interfering with covered 
social media platforms’ decisions about what content or accounts to host, their 
enforcement of their content policies, and their decisions about how to arrange and 
display content. 
In addition, S.B. 7072 harms internet users and the public. Two provisions 
are especially detrimental to the public interest: S.B. 7072’s prohibition on 
suspending political candidates’ accounts for more than fourteen days and its 
prohibition on removing or labeling content by journalistic enterprises. These 
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provisions harm internet users and the public by preventing social media platforms 
from effectively responding to illegal, offensive, misleading, or graphic content 
posted by any user, including politicians, journalists, and everyday individuals, and 
thereby depriving users of the ability to choose platforms on which they can avoid 
such content. 
For these reasons, CDT urges the Court to affirm the district court’s grant of 
a preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of S.B. 7072. 
ARGUMENT 
 
I. Content moderation requires online intermediaries to make editorial 
decisions about whether and how to host user-generated content. 
 
Users of online services post millions or even billions of pieces of content 
every day. See, e.g., Josh Constine, How Big is Facebook’s Data? 2.5 Billion 
Pieces of Content and 500+ Terabytes Ingested Every Day, TechCrunch (Aug. 22, 
2012);1 Anmar Frangoul, With Over 1 Billion Users, Here’s How YouTube Is 
Keeping Pace With Change, CNBC (Mar. 14, 2018) (reporting that more than 500 
hours of new content are uploaded to YouTube every minute);2 Staff, Reddit’s 






youtube-is-keeping-pace-with-change.html [https://perma.cc/ZW6F-JH28].  
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million posts and 2 billion comments in 2020).3 “Content moderation” is the set of 
policies, systems, and tools that online hosts of user-generated content use to 
decide what user-generated content or accounts to allow or forbid and how to 
display and arrange the content they host. See Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Automation 
in Moderation, 53 Cornell Int’l L.J. 41, 42, 48 (2020).  
Though content moderation differs from host to host, it often involves the 
creation of a “content policy,” or set of rules about what content is and is not 
allowed on a service. Spandana Singh, Everything in Moderation, Open Tech. Inst. 
(July 22, 2019).4 A host’s decision about what content to allow on its service may 
be based on its judgment about what content is most useful or attractive to its 
users, the type of community a host wishes to build, or the values or messages a 
host wants to convey. Because content policies differ from service-to-service, users 
can choose between services based on the content policies that best fit their needs.  
Through content policies, hosts control and shape the particular topics and 
environment available on their services. A host’s content policy may permit only 
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Guidelines, Goodreads (last visited Nov. 12, 2021)5 (“Goodreads is a community 
where you can discuss exactly what brought you here in the first place—books!”). 
It may limit the content permitted to create a particular tone or environment on its 
service, such as a professional atmosphere, see LinkedIn Professional Community 
Policies, LinkedIn (last visited Nov. 12, 2021)6 (explaining that LinkedIn wants its 
service “to reflect the best version of professional life” and that all content should 
be “professionally relevant”), or one appropriate for children, see Community 
Guidelines, Kinzoo (last visited Nov. 12, 2021)7 (prohibiting, on a private 
messaging app for kids and parents, the sharing of content that is inappropriate for 
children including “bad words or external links”). Some hosts’ content policies 
foster conversation among likeminded individuals and limit viewpoints that would 
be disruptive or unwelcome. For example, the true crime investigation web forum 
Websleuths prohibits “attacking or bashing a victim” or posting information about 
victims’ family members, friends, or others who have not been officially 
designated as suspects in a crime, as well as “[t]rolling or making posts with the 






7 https://kinzoo.com/community-guidelines/ [https://perma.cc/NU9Q-8XSE].  
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Websleuths (last visited Nov. 12, 2021).8 Hosts’ decisions about their content 
policies allow diverse users to choose the online services that best serve their 
interests and needs. 
Content policies also allow hosts to express their own values and their 
aspirations for their services. For example, the hyperlocal social networking 
service NextDoor believes that “[b]y bringing neighbors and organizations 
together, we can cultivate a kinder world where everyone has a neighborhood they 
can rely on.” We Believe In the Possibilities Nearby, NextDoor (last visited Nov. 
12, 2021).9 It uses its Community Guidelines “to define the values of the 
community we want to build”: a place where users feel “a shared connection to a 
place—your neighborhood.” Community Guidelines, NextDoor (last visited Nov. 
12, 2021).10 TikTok, a video-based social networking site, explains that its 
“mission is to inspire creativity and bring joy.” Community Guidelines, TikTok 









[https://perma.cc/6HGW-786W].   
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supportive environment for our community,” as it seeks to “build[] a global 
community where people can create and share, discover the world around them, 
and connect with others across the globe.” Id. The online parenting community 
BabyCenter describes its “philosophy” as “welcom[ing] all, no matter what stage 
of the parenting journey you are on” and says it “value[s] an honest and supportive 
exchange of ideas and experiences.” BabyCenter Community Guidelines, 
BabyCenter (last visited Nov. 12, 2021).12 Its content rules are designed to further 
that philosophy by ensuring the site remains “a place where differences in 
philosophies, beliefs, opinions, and parenting styles are welcomed.” Id. 
Other hosts may mold the environment of their services by setting a baseline 
content policy but empowering their users to create additional content rules that 
reflect users’ preferences and values. For example, the social media site Reddit 
consists of a network of communities called “subreddits” that are created and run 
by users. Reddit Content Policy, Reddit (last visited Nov. 12, 2021).13 While 
Reddit itself has a content policy, it also allows each individual subreddit to shape 
its own culture by establishing more specific rules. Id. Thus, a subreddit devoted to 
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leaving the Catholic Church or disobedience to her teachings or her leaders,” see 
Catholicism: All about the Catholic faith, Reddit (last visited Nov. 12, 2021),14 
while a subreddit devoted to a popular television show can prohibit “serious 
spoilers” about the show in titles of posts, see The Great British Bake Off, Reddit 
(last visited Nov. 12, 2021).15 
In addition to the creation of a content policy, content moderation also 
involves detection of content that violates that policy. The technical realities of 
hosting massive amounts of user-generated content shape hosts’ ability to detect 
violating content and enforce their content policies. Hosts typically use some form 
of user-reporting of unwanted or abusive content to detect violating content, 
through which users flag a post for review by the host. See Singh, supra. Some 
services also use automated systems to assist in moderating content, including for 
spam and malware, but also to detect more subjective rule violations such as hate 
speech or disinformation. Id.16 (describing the use of natural language processing 
to detect hate speech). And in some cases, hosts may have employees or 
contractors who manually review content for violations. Because automated 
 
14 https://www.reddit.com/r/Catholicism/ [https://perma.cc/H8AU-F88U].  
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methods of detection are imperfect, see Carey Shenkman, Dhanaraj Thakur, & 
Emma Llansó, Do You See What I See? Capabilities and Limits of Automated 
Multimedia Content Analysis, Ctr. for Democracy & Tech. (May 2021),17 and hosts 
typically cannot manually review all posts before making them available to users, 
hosts will inadvertently host material that is contrary to their stated content 
policies. See evelyn douek, Governing Online Speech: From “Posts-As-Trumps” 
to Proportionality and Probability, 121 Colum. L. Rev. 759, 792 (Apr. 2021). 
Once content is identified as potentially violating a host’s rules, the host 
must evaluate the content and enforce its content policy. Enforcement is not just a 
binary decision to either take down content or accounts or allow them to remain on 
a service; depending on how they have designed their service, hosts can take a 
wide variety of actions against violative content. See Eric Goldman, Content 
Moderation Remedies, Mich. Tech. L. Rev. (Forthcoming 2021);18 Mike Masnick, 
Platforms, Speech and Truth: Policy, Policing and Impossible Choices, Techdirt 
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about how to arrange and display content. For example, some hosts may decrease 
the availability of a post that violates or comes close to violating their content 
policies by downgrading its visibility in search results or users’ feeds or restricting 
forwarding or sharing of it. Goldman, supra. Hosts may also use their own 
affirmative speech to enforce their content policies, such as by adding a fact-check 
or a warning before users may access certain content. Id.  
Enforcement decisions can require hosts to make difficult editorial judgment 
calls, particularly when user-generated content falls into a “gray area” that defies 
easy categorization. See Nuts & Bolts of Content Moderation: A Primer for 
Policymakers on Content Moderation, Engine & Charles Koch Inst. at 5, 7–8 
(Sept. 2019).20 For example, a host that prohibits users from posting forged or 
altered information must decide how to apply this policy to a news outlet that posts 
a clip of a “deepfake” video of a political candidate as part of a story about how 
this technology can spread misinformation. Id. at 7.  
In short, content moderation is the process by which a host makes editorial 
judgments about what speech to include or exclude from its service and how to 




df [https://perma.cc/A3J3-L732].  
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allow it to shape users’ experiences, the messages that it will display, and the 
values a host wishes to convey through its service. 
II. S.B. 7072 violates the First Amendment and harms internet users and 
the public by interfering with hosts’ content moderation practices. 
 
A. The First Amendment protects the exercise of editorial discretion, 
including by speakers that host others’ speech. 
 
In Miami Herald, the Supreme Court established that the First Amendment 
prohibits government interference with a private speaker’s editorial control and 
judgment, i.e., the decisions a speaker makes about what to include or exclude in 
her speech and how to arrange or distribute that speech. 418 U.S. at 258 (“The 
choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to limitations 
on the size and content of the paper, and treatment of public issues and public 
officials—whether fair or unfair—constitute the exercise of editorial control and 
judgment.”). As Justice White explained in his concurring opinion, the First 
Amendment protects private speakers’ control of their editorial judgments because 
any system that supplants it with “the heavy hand of government intrusion” would 
“make the government the censor of what the people may read and know.” Id. at 
261 (White, J., concurring). 
Although the Miami Herald Court recognized the First Amendment’s strong 
protection for the exercise of editorial judgment as a result of a print newspaper’s 
challenge to a Florida “right of reply” statute, id. at 244, this protection does not 
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depend on whether a speaker operates in a manner similar or identical to a 
newspaper. Indeed, as the Court recognized in that very case, “[g]overnmental 
restraint on publishing need not fall into familiar or traditional patterns to be 
subject to constitutional limitations on governmental powers.” Id. at 256.  
The First Amendment right to exercise editorial discretion extends to 
speakers who hosts others’ speech, to speakers who are far less selective about the 
speech they host than a typical print newspaper, and to speakers who have a less 
coherent or unified message than a traditional news outlet. In Hurley v. Irish-
American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, for example, the Supreme 
Court held that the First Amendment protects a parade organizer’s decision about 
what marchers to accept, despite the fact that the organizer was “rather lenient in 
admitting participants” to its parade. 515 U.S. 557, 569–70 (1995). As the Court 
explained, “[A] private speaker does not forfeit constitutional protection simply by 
combining multifarious voices, or by failing to edit their themes to isolate an exact 
message as the exclusive subject matter of the speech,” or by failing “to generate, 
as an original matter, each item featured in the communication.” Id. Lower courts 
have recognized that the First Amendment right to exercise editorial control and 
judgment extends to other speakers as well, including online intermediaries. See 
Br. of Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press et al. as Amici Curiae in Support 
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of Pls.’ Mot. For Prelim. Inj., NetChoice, LLC et al. v. Moody, 4:21-cv-00220-RH-
MAF at 12–13 (June 14, 2021), ECF No. 71-1 (collecting cases). 
S.B. 7072 impinges on covered social media platforms’ exercise of editorial 
control and judgment by interfering with their development and enforcement of 
their content policies. The First Amendment’s protection for a platform’s exercise 
of editorial judgment does not turn on whether the platform screens all of the third-
party content it hosts or whether it makes decisions about what content to host 
based on viewpoint, like a newspaper.21 Rather, the relevant question is whether 
 
21 While these factors are not determinative of the applicability of the Miami 
Herald standard to content moderation decisions by online hosts, some social 
media companies do screen all of the content they host before it is published, see, 
e.g., Rachel Cericola, Ring Neighbors is the Best and Worst Neighborhood Watch 
App, N.Y. Times (June 3, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/wirecutter/blog/ring-
neighbors-app-review/ [https://perma.cc/5PDJ-QYTA] (stating that all posts on the 
neighborhood watch app Neighbors “are ‘proactively moderated’ as [the company] 
makes sure they adhere to the company’s guidelines”), and many online 
intermediaries screen much if not all content using automated systems for detecting 
certain illegal content, like child sexual abuse material, see Justin Paine & John 
Graham-Cumming, Announcing the CSAM Scanning Tool, Free for All Cloudflare 
Customers, Cloudflare (Dec. 18, 2019), https://blog.cloudflare.com/the-csam-
scanning-tool/ [https://perma.cc/6K77-2FV5].   
In addition, social media companies routinely make decisions about what 
content to host based on viewpoint. See, e.g., Dangerous Individuals and 




(prohibiting content that “praises” or “substantively supports” violent events or 
their perpetrators, including terrorist attacks or hate crimes, and content that 
“praises” or “substantively supports” certain hateful ideologies, such as Nazism 
and white supremacy); Suicide & Self-Harm, TikTok (last visited Nov. 12, 2021), 
USCA11 Case: 21-12355     Date Filed: 11/15/2021     Page: 23 of 34 
 
 17 
S.B. 7072 intrudes on a covered platform’s ability to choose what speech to host or 
not host and how to distribute and arrange the speech it hosts. 
S.B. 7072 requires covered platforms to host content or accounts that they 
otherwise would not host in at least three ways. First, S.B. 7072 prohibits covered 
platforms from updating their content policies more than once every thirty days. 
Fla. Stat. § 501.2041(2)(c). By forbidding covered platforms from updating or 
refining their content policies at will, S.B. 7072 requires them to host content that 
they otherwise would not, at least for a time. Second, S.B. 7072 forbids covered 
platforms from barring for more than fourteen days an account by a person they 
know to be a candidate for political office in Florida22 or an account by certain 
journalistic enterprises,23 based on the content of their publications or broadcasts. 
 
https://www.tiktok.com/safety/en/suicide-self-harm/ [https://perma.cc/A2Y4-
5BXS] (prohibiting content promoting or glorifying suicide and self-harm).  
22 For purposes of S.B. 7072, a “candidate” is defined as “[a] person who 
files qualification papers and subscribes to a candidate’s oath as required by law.” 
Fla. Stat. § 106.011(3)(e); Fla. Stat. § 106.072(1)(a). 
23 S.B. 7072 defines “journalistic enterprise” as “an entity doing business in 
Florida that:”  
1. Publishes in excess of 100,000 words available online 
with at least 50,000 paid subscribers or 100,000 monthly 
active users;  
2. Publishes 100 hours of audio or video available online 
with at least 100 million viewers annually; 
3. Operates a cable channel that provides more than 40 
hours of content per week to more than 100,000 cable 
television subscribers; or 
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Fla. Stat. § 106.072(2); Fla. Stat. § 501.2041(1)(c), (2)(j). This too requires 
platforms to host speech from accounts that violate their content policies and that 
they would permanently ban if not for the law. Third, S.B. 7072 prohibits covered 
platforms from deleting or adding an addendum to content by journalistic 
enterprises based on the content of their publications or broadcasts, Fla. Stat. 
§ 501.2041(1)(b), (2)(j), requiring them to host content that violates their content 
policies and that they otherwise would remove and prohibiting them from 
expressing their own opinions about the information in the form of a fact-check or 
label.  
S.B. 7072 also chills covered platforms from enforcing their content 
policies, particularly in difficult or close cases. It requires covered platforms to 
moderate content “in a consistent manner among its users on the platform.” Fla. 
Stat. § 501.2041(2)(b). However, S.B. 7072 does not define “consistency.” This 
vagueness, coupled with the prospect that platforms’ enforcement decisions will be 
subject to government scrutiny, will cause some covered platforms to decide not to 
enforce their content policies against content they determine violates their policies, 
out of fear that the government will determine that other policy-violating content 
 
4. Operates under a broadcast license issued by the Federal 
437 Communications Commission. 
Fla. Stat. § 501.2041(1)(d). 
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on their service escaped their enforcement, leaving them open to a charge of 
“inconsistency.” Other platforms may adopt black-and-white rules that ignore 
context, moderate content in an overbroad manner, or both, in hopes of adequately 
capturing every potential violation. S.B. 7072’s vague requirement for “consistent” 
content moderation fails to understand the nature of this editorial activity and will 
interfere with covered platforms’ exercise of their editorial discretion. 
At bottom, perfect enforcement of content policies at scale is impossible for 
any online service; every host will exhibit some kind of inconsistency, whether 
because of barriers to their ability to detect violating content, see Section I, supra, 
or the difficulty of appreciating every relevant element of context and nuance for a 
given post, see Mike Masnick, It’s Not Personal: Content Moderation Always 
Involves Mistakes, Including Suspending Experts Sharing Knowledge, Techdirt 
(June 1, 2021).24 The effect will be to give government authorities unbridled 
discretion in deciding which platforms to punish and which ones not to punish.    
Finally, S.B. 7072 impinges on covered platforms’ decisions about how to 
arrange and display content on their services. It prohibits covered platforms from 
using an algorithm during an election to make content by or about political 
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or in search results and from using an algorithm during an election to limit or 
eliminate the exposure of such content to other users. Fla. Stat. § 501.2041(1)(e), 
(1)(f), (2)(h). It also prohibits covered platforms from eliminating or limiting the 
exposure of content by journalistic enterprises to other users of the platform based 
on the content of their publications or broadcasts. Fla. Stat. § 501.2041(1)(f), (2)(j). 
Thus, S.B. 7072 prohibits a covered platform from making certain decisions about 
how to display content from political candidates or journalistic enterprises based 
on its judgment that particular content is more or less interesting or useful to its 
users, or that it violates or nearly violates its content policy.  
Social media platforms inevitably make mistakes when engaging in content 
moderation at scale and make enforcement decisions that are controversial, at 
times resulting in criticism that their content moderation policies are not being 
applied consistently. Civil society organizations, including CDT, have criticized 
hosts when they engage in content moderation in ways that harm free expression 
and other human rights. See, e.g., Emma Llansó & Mallory Knodel, CDT Joins 
Article 19, Other Human Rights Orgs in Urging Instagram for Transparency 
About Content Moderation Changes in India, Ctr. for Democracy & Tech. (May 
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substituting its judgment for the judgment of private speakers about what editorial 
policies to put in place, how to apply and enforce those policies, and, ultimately, 
what speech to host or not to host. The district court correctly enjoined S.B. 7072 
because it is unconstitutional. 
B. S.B. 7072 harms the public interest.  
 
S.B. 7072 also harms internet users and the public. Two provisions in S.B. 
7072 are especially detrimental to the public interest: the prohibition on barring 
political candidates’ accounts for more than fourteen days and the prohibition on 
removing or labeling content by journalistic enterprises.  
S.B. 7072’s prohibition on a covered platform suspending the account of a 
person it knows to be a candidate for office in Florida for more than fourteen days 
applies no matter how severely or persistently the candidate violates a platform’s 
content policy or even the law. For example, even if a candidate for office in 
Florida used a covered platform’s service to send sexually explicit images to 
children,26 S.B. 7072 would prohibit the platform from permanently banning or 
suspending the candidate’s account for more than two weeks even if the platform 
 
26 See, e.g., Benjamin Weiser & William K. Rashbaum, Anthony Weiner 
Pleads Guilty to Federal Obscenity Charge, N.Y. Times (May 19, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/19/nyregion/anthony-weiner-guilty-plea-
sexting.html [https://perma.cc/U4PU-LCWQ] (reporting on the sentencing of 
former congressman and New York mayoral candidate Anthony Weiner, who sent 
explicit messages to a fifteen-year-old girl over social media).  
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would do so for any other type of user. S.B. 7072 would also prohibit a covered 
platform from permanently banning or suspending for more than two weeks the 
account of a candidate for office in Florida who violates its content policy by, for 
example, promoting a conspiracy theory that the September 11 attacks were 
faked,27 making racist statements,28 or impersonating someone else29—again, even 
if those types of violations would result in a ban of any other user’s account.  
 
27 See, e.g., Alice Workman, This One Nation Candidate Suggested the 9/11 
Terror Attacks Were Faked, BuzzFeed News (Feb. 1, 2017), 
https://www.buzzfeed.com/aliceworkman/this-one-nation-candidate-suggested-the-
911-terror-attacks-w?utm_term=.daZPwN5emO#.ibmMjPRWor 
[https://perma.cc/FW8Q-QJJP] (reporting that an Australian political candidate 
“posted and endorsed conspiracy theories about the September 11 terror attacks on 
his Facebook page”); see also False News, Facebook (last visited Nov. 12, 2021), 
https://transparency.fb.com/policies/community-standards/false-news/ 
[https://perma.cc/3ST6-APMU].  
28 Emily Sullivan, Twitter Bans GOP Contender for Racist Tweet Targeting 
Meghan Markle, NPR (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2018/02/13/585339969/twitter-bans-gop-contender-for-racist-tweet-targeting-
meghan-markle [https://perma.cc/8F9Z-Y4MB] (reporting that Twitter banned a 
political candidate who had previously tweeted anti-Semitic remarks after he 
tweeted a racist remark about American actress and then-soon-to-be Duchess of 
Sussex Meghan Markle, who is biracial); see also Hateful Conduct Policy, Twitter 
(last visited Nov. 12, 2021), https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/hateful-
conduct-policy [https://perma.cc/494T-BXSH]. 
29 Nelson Oliveira, Man Behind Viral Cormac McCarthy Parody Account 
that Twitter Suspended is California Gubernatorial Candidate, N.Y. Daily News 
(Aug. 9, 2021), https://www.nydailynews.com/snyde/ny-man-behind-viral-cormac-
mccarthy-parody-twitter-california-governor-candidate-20210809-
njj2ifffs5ckfnlfiuhhvzjjte-story.html [https://perma.cc/A4UB-8RCY]; see also 
Impersonation Policy, Twitter (last visited Nov. 12, 2021), 
https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/twitter-impersonation-policy 
[https://perma.cc/7JX8-DX2E]. Although the fake Cormac McCarthy Twitter 
USCA11 Case: 21-12355     Date Filed: 11/15/2021     Page: 29 of 34 
 
 23 
S.B. 7072’s prohibition on deleting or labeling content by certain journalistic 
enterprises would prevent a covered platform from removing or fact-checking 
posts by fake or misleading websites masquerading as news sites, which could 
qualify as “journalistic enterprises” under the law. See PolitiFact Staff, Politifact's 
Guide to Fake News Websites and What They Peddle, PolitiFact (Apr. 20, 2017).30 
It would prohibit covered platforms from removing or fact-checking certain 
foreign purveyors of disinformation about American politicians and elections,31 
undermining trust in our democracy and the right to vote. Sylvia Albert et al., As a 
Matter of Fact: The Harms Caused by Election Disinformation, Common Cause 
 
account was a parody, S.B. 7072 would prohibit a covered social media platform 
from permanently banning candidate for office in Florida even if she intentionally 
and maliciously impersonated another person, including, for example, her 
opponent. 
30 https://www.politifact.com/article/2017/apr/20/politifacts-guide-fake-
news-websites-and-what-they/ [https://perma.cc/HQ2F-HJZK].  
31 See, e.g., Zana Cimili & Raphael Satter, In Macedonia’s Fake News Hub, 
Teen Shows AP How It’s Done, Assoc. Press (Dec. 2, 2016), 
https://apnews.com/article/12fc49ad3b694f35b5c4a08513ec8d33 (reporting that a 
Macedonian teenager “managed to gather more than 685,000 page views a week” 
for his “fake news operation”); see also Emma Llansó & Ben Horton, Online Voter 
Suppression: How to Spot It & How to Counter It, Ctr. for Democracy & Tech. at 4 
(Oct. 2020), https://cdt.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/2020-10-14-Voter-
Suppression-paper-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/5DPR-XCN7] (noting that 
inaccurate information about elections may appear to come from a trusted source). 
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Educ. Fund at 5 (Oct. 2021).32 S.B. 7072 would also prohibit a covered platform 
from labeling graphic or disturbing news content, to the detriment of users who 
want a warning to prepare them before viewing such content or do not want to 
view such content at all. See Samuel Gibbs, Facebook Tackles Graphic Videos and 
Photos With 'Are You Sure?' Warnings, Guardian (Jan. 13, 2015);33 Teddy Wayne, 
The Trauma of Violent News on the Internet, N.Y. Times (Sept. 10, 2016).34 
These provisions of S.B. 7072 harm internet users and the public. They 
prevent covered platforms from effectively responding to illegal, offensive, 
misleading, or graphic content. They undermine internet users’ ability to control 
whether and how they engage with particular types of content online or to choose 
platforms that would enable them to avoid types of content they find objectionable. 










news-on-the-internet.html [https://perma.cc/HG56-NPQJ].   





For the foregoing reasons, amicus respectfully urges this Court to affirm the 
district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of S.B. 
7072. 
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